This paper draws lessons from post-World War II Western European economic performance for the current U.S. economy. We document that much of Western Europe grew very quickly from the end of World War II up to the mid-1970s, reflecting policies that incentivized technology adoption and investment in physical and human capital.
Introduction
Ten years after the Great Recession of 2007-09, U.S. real GDP, productivity, and other aggregate economic indicators remain well below their historical trend levels. This empirical pattern, in which the U.S. economy has not returned to its long-run trend following an economic downturn, is unprecedented.
For nearly 250 years, the U.S. has recovered from enormous economic and political shocks, including the Civil War, two World Wars, the Great Depression, and the high inflation and oil crises of the 1970s. Following each of these events, the U.S. economy returned to trend. In sharp contrast to this historical record of recovery to trend, the current state of the U.S. economy shows no sign of recovering as it did following previous downturns. Economists are currently developing and testing various hypotheses for why the economy has not recovered, ranging across a broad set of ideas. These range from the possibility of Figure 2: Employment-Population Ratio, 16 years and over: 1990.1-2018.5 very persistent effects from the financial and housing crises, as suggested, among others, by Atif, Amir, and Francesco (2015) , to difficulties in understanding the relevant probability distributions of shocks, as hypothesized by Kozlowski, Veldkamp, and Venkateswaran (2015) , to challenges in creating new technological innovations, as argued in Gordon (2016) .
To date, nevertheless, we remain far from a satisfactory accounting of this failure to recover. Moreover, since this failure to recover is unprecedented, it is useful to compare other episodes of recovery failures to see how they may shed light on the U.S. experience.
The paper makes such a comparison with the economic slowdown that occurred in several Western European countries much earlier.
The European economic slowdown began in the late 1970s and continues today. We make this comparison because the U.S. and Europe are similar in many respects and because the two episodes share many similar economic features. This chapter presents evidence that the post-World War II history of Western and Northern Europe provides insights into why the U.S. remains depressed relative to trend. We also argue that the European experience offers guidance in terms of constructive economic policy changes for today's U.S. economy.
We will show a number of parallels between Europe and the U.S. This will include a large shift in productivity from trend, as well as significant changes in what Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2017) call business dynamism, which includes declines in reallocation and entrepreneurship. Europe's slowdown was driven by a very sudden drop in productivity growth, very similar to the U.S. We will also describe how policies and entrepreneurship declined.
The paper is organized as follows. We start, in Section 2, by describing the 30 glorious years of post-World War II Western European economic growth and, in Section 3, how those years came to an end. Section 4 lists some prominent reasons for the lack of TFP growth in Europe during the last decades. Section 5 outlines a theory of the political economy of such slow TFP growth. Section 6 concludes by outlining some lessons for the U.S. and its economic policy.
The 30 glorious years of postwar Western European economic growth
In 1979, French economist Jean Fourastié published his classic monograph Les Trente
Gloriouses (Fourastié, 1979) . The title of the book, which translates into "The Glorious
Thirty," refers to the 30-year period in France between 1946 and 1975 . It is clear why Fourastié looked at this period as a glorious one. Not only were these years when peace and independence returned to France following the wars and economic crisis of 1914-1945, but also they were decades of unprecedented prosperity and structural transformation. Figure 4 plots real GDP per capita relative to the U.S. for these countries plus the U.K.
(the five largest in Western Europe) between 1950 and 1989. Figure 4 shows that all of these countries were able to considerably catch up with the U.S., except for the U.K., which was initially much wealthier than the other members of the group, and which had terrible tax policies in place for much of this period (Cooley and Ohanian, 1997) .
The post-World War II Western European economic miracles demonstrate that economic recovery and very rapid per capita GDP growth occur even after the most devastating shocks.
This is important, as it is often argued that the financial crisis and the resulting loss of 1 In the following paragraphs, we use data from the Penn World Table 9 .0, which starts in 1950. We move, thus, "The Glorious Thirty," to 1950 Thirty," to -1980 . Choosing 1950 as a starting date is probably a better idea than using 1946, as the brisk economic recovery during the four years right after the end of World War II reflected the fruits of a return to normalcy. Indeed, France's GDP per capita had surpassed its pre-war peak already in 1949. And France's GDP per capita still increased 16 percent between 1975 and 1980, effectively prolonging the years of prosperity. To compute GDP per capita, we divide the variable rgdpna (real GDP using national accounts) by the variable pop (population). : 1950-1989 wealth necessarily mean that recovery following the Great Recession will be delayed for a long time (see Taylor, 2015 , for such a view). The systematic and rapid growth of these European economies, all of which had lost enormous wealth during the war, provides a very strong counterexample of this view and is an important reason why we focus on policies and institutional factors that may be impeding the normal market process of economic recovery.
Indeed, transitional dynamics of post-World War II capital stocks being below their steady-state levels does not plausibly account for these growth miracles (see King and Rebelo, 1993) . While capital stock dynamics did play some role, productivity growth was the primary factor driving Western European economic growth. France, Germany, Italy, and Spain all experienced rapid yearly total factor productivity (TFP) growth between 2.6 and 3.2 percent over this period. These growth rates are even more impressive if we highlight that the Penn World Table subtracts the effects of increases in human capital in its computation of TFP.
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In contrast, many traditional measures of TFP take labor as homogeneous over time and, therefore, tend to yield an unduly overoptimistic report of productivity growth.
To provide a graphical sense of this TFP growth, Figure 5 plots the evolution of TFP for
France, Germany, Italy, and Spain from 1950 to 1990. We normalize TFP in each country to 1 in 1950; that is, we look at how productivity evolved in each nation and not at a 2 In particular, we use the variable rtfpna (real TFP using national accounts). (a still respectable roughly 1 percent a year; recall that we subtract the effects of changes in the average education of the labor force and, thus, the number may be a bit lower than the number the reader may remember from other contexts).
Besides excellent demographics, some other factors drove postwar European productivity growth. One is that many technological innovations developed earlier in the century had not been adopted in Europe as a consequence of World War I and the Great Depression.
As Eichengreen (2008) (Silberman, Weiss, and Dutz, 1996) . Management schools, mainly unknown in Europe before 1945, quickly proliferated (Kaplan, 2014 : 1990-2014 However, this view omits the important forces for continued catch-up in Europe. TFP levels in France, Germany, Italy, and other Western European countries remained about 40 percent below the U.S. level. This indicates there was additional room for European catchup and, more broadly, an opportunity for Europe to become more competitive with the U.S.
in its export markets. Moreover, even if the European catch-up was slowing down, theory suggests this should have been a much more gradual process, in which we should observe a very slowly declining rate of TFP growth over time, rather than the discrete and sudden slowdown in TFP growth that occurred.
The change in performance in Western Europe became much starker after 1990. Figure 6 plots the GDP per capita relative to the U.S. of the same group of nations from 1990 to 2014, again from Penn World Table data (including the adjustment for German reunification). In this new figure, we see either virtually no catch-up (Germany and the U.K.) or a regression (mild in Spain, quite striking for France and Italy).
The seriousness of the situation is even more acute if we emphasize that France, Italy, and Spain were still increasing the average years of formal education of their labor force (a protracted process due to demographic lags) and improving their physical infrastructures.
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In other words: there was nearly no TFP growth. 4 Why no TFP growth in Western Europe?
As we discussed above, TFP growth comes from the innovation and adoption of new technologies, business models, and managerial practices. Europe has been failing on all three fronts for the last several decades. The continent develops less economically useful technologies than other comparable economic regions, it is reluctant to allow the introduction of new business models, and it lags in the adoption of new managerial practices.
This unfortunate state of affairs is unrelated to cultural traits or idiosyncratic preferences.
For centuries, Europe was at the forefront of technological innovation and adoption. Moreover -as reported in previous pages-in the decades following World War II, Europeans showed a more than considerable skill in catching up with the technological frontier, innovating in relevant fields, and working more extended hours than North Americans.
The reason, instead, for the European lack of TFP growth is the pervasive dominance of what Parente and Prescott (2002) have called barriers to riches. In the short space of this article, we cannot review each of them in detail, but we can highlight some of the most salient. Given the considerable heterogeneity existing within Europe (even excluding the U.K. and Switzerland, countries that have decided to follow different paths along essential aspects of their economic policies) and the multitude of industries in any modern economy, our presentation is more impressionistic than systematic, and exceptions to the mechanisms outlined below are easy to find. For instance, Scandinavian and Baltic countries suffer less from the maladies described here (also, for this article, we are excluding Russia, with all of its peculiarities and rather different economic structure). However, the preponderance of the evidence points out that these exceptions do not outweigh the more general norm of limitations to TFP growth in the major countries of the European continent.
Widespread barriers to entry
Widespread barriers to entry plague sector after sector of many European economies.
Some are regulatory (burdensome administrative requirements, protected activities, licensing restrictions), and some are financial (including limited access to venture capital or seed funds).
Perhaps the most famous example is the difficulties that Amazon has faced in countries such as France (we will discuss some of these below when talking about the lack of competition).
But Amazon is not an isolated case. Firms such as Uber, Google, Netflix, and many others face regulatory barriers to entry in European markets. 7 Also, if the burden for large corporations is heavy but manageable, the cost for small startups is often overwhelming. This leads to fewer new highly successful companies being created. (2008) 7 A recent example of a surrealistic barrier is the regional government of Valencia, Spain, threatening Susana Meseguer, who shows her small village to the rare passing tourist for a small tip, with a e 600.000 fine because she lacks proper professional licensing. The fact that no licensed tourist guide will ever find profitable to set up shop in a small, remote village does not matter much. See https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/ 08/23/inenglish/1535019697_094488.html A striking result illustrating this point is provided by Philippon and Véron (2008) . These authors compile the age of creation of the firms in the FT Global 500 ranking of world companies by market cap as of September 30, 2007, and plot, in Figure 8 , the "population pyramid" of the U.S. and European firms that appear in this ranking. While the U.S. has created 26 companies since 1975 that, by 2007, had entered into the FT Global 500, Europe has only created 3. Since ample evidence suggests that new firms drive much of TFP growth (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan, 2001 ), Figure 8 is the perfect summary of Europe's TFP growth problems.
Lack of competition
Related, but not equal to barriers to entry, is the lack of competition in many industries and the lax enforcement of competition law.
Since we talked before about Amazon's travails in France, we can return to the book industry. France, like many other European countries (Germany, Spain, Italy, etc.) has a fixed book price statute. This legislation mandates that a publisher must set a price for any book it edits or imports and booksellers (either a traditional retailer or an electronic shop such as Amazon) must sell the book at that price, perhaps with the freedom to offer a small rebate (in the case of France, up to 5 percent).
8 Fixed price statutes limit the ability of large bookstores to discount books and take advantage of their lower operating costs. In the case of an electronic shop, such as Amazon, fixed price statutes also remove one of the main benefits of its business model: lower prices in exchange for the inconvenience of having to wait for the arrival of a book that can often be found in a local bookstore. 
High regulation
Imagine that you are the CEO of a professional soccer team in Spain. This is big business.
Real Madrid, for example, is valued by Forbes at $4.1 billion and it has annual revenue of $735 million. Thus, you decide to hire Zinedine Zidane as the coach for your reserve team. This makes a lot of sense. Besides being one of the best soccer players ever, Zidane has been the assistant manager of the main team, a task he has performed to the applause of sports critics and fans and he has been linked with the club for over a decade. He knows the club and how it works.
However, one day, to your big surprise, you are sued for this decision. Why? It turns out that to work as a coach in a professional soccer team in Spain you need to go through a rigorous certification process whereby you attend lectures on some pathbreaking material such as "the etymological evolution of the word 'sport' " (a philosophical discussion on the topic may help players focus before a challenging match) or "differences in sport practices To make a long legal history short, Zidane was first fined and expelled from the Spanish league but, on appeal, the Real Madrid legal team found a loophole (due to Zidane's French citizenship) that fixed the problem (and went on to be the first coach in history to win three consecutive UEFA Champions League titles).
Zidane's legal adventures could be just an anecdote, but it is an example among thousands of similar cases of surrealistic regulations and pervasive unjustified licensing requirements across Europe. From the ownership of pharmacies to the opening of gas stations, from media content to the rules governing private colleges, from gym operations to funerary services, industry after industry is controlled by regulations that slow down the adoption of better practices and stifle creativity. Worse, regulations sometimes mean that entire industries, such as tight oil, never appear in Europe. Finally, these regulations are protected and effectively enforced (sometimes even beyond the letter of the law and resorting to violence) by pressure groups that have much to gain from them.
The "Doing Business Index" elaborated by the World Bank ranks 190 countries by how easy it is to conduct business in them, and it summarizes the evidence more systematically.
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Among major continental European countries, Germany appears first, at position 17 in the overall ranking. While this performance is not entirely disappointing, in the subcategory of starting a business, Germany's position collapses to 114. Indeed, European countries benefit, in the overall ranking, from their openness to trade induced by the European Single Market.
The countries do much worse in all other categories than what their overall ranking would suggest. Other European countries perform even worse than Germany: France (29 overall), Spain (32 overall), and Italy (50 overall).
14 These topics are actual quotations from the certification process. See the official Spanish legislation https://www.boe.es/buscar/doc.php?id=BOE-A-2000-5990.
15 See http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings, consulted on June 12, 2017.
Inefficient capital markets
Innovation and adoption are costly activities. And those individuals and firms that undertake them are, often, not those with access to the funds to finance them. A young engineer fresh out of college with a brilliant business plan requires funds. A pension fund with billions of dollars to invest lacks attractive new ideas to invest in. Financial markets are supposed to fix these problems: they match agents that have funds with agents that require those resources.
European capital markets underachieve in fulfilling this task. The most discussed case is venture capital. According to the CB Insights Venture Report 2014, the European venture capital industry (including the U.K.) was only 18.5 percent the size of the American one in terms of total investment amount and around 30 percent in terms of the number of deals.
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This difference in size is especially salient in the latest stages of firms' development, perhaps indicating that few European companies reach a size that deserves further investment.
Worse still, the response of European governments to the weakness of the venture capital industry has been, on many occasions, to create government-owned investment funds that crowd out private capitalists, introduce political considerations into the allocations of funds, and complicate the organic growth of the industry.
Briefly, other problems of European capital markets include small and fragmented stock exchanges, the high cost of IPOs, excessive regulation of publicly traded firms, an incomplete banking union, and an inordinate reliance on bank financing.
Education and R&D system
Innovation activity in the modern world is overwhelmingly concentrated among highly educated individuals and, often, undertaken in the context of complex R&D systems.
Concerning education, continental European countries usually do a good job regarding primary and secondary education, even if the pedagogical approaches in some countries have traditionally been more focused on memorization and drilling than on spurring creativity. The benefit of higher productivity and/or utility from it is relatively smaller with respect to the transition cost. This can occur both at an individual level (e.g., an engineer may be reluctant to learn a new programming language if she will only use it for a few years before retirement) and at an aggregate level (e.g., the political process will be less likely to embrace change and reforms as the median voter has aged).
European countries are getting older and more progressively so. Figure 9 plots the forecasted population pyramids of Germany (left column), the largest continental European country, against the U.S. (right column) in 2050. 22 Germany's pyramid is considerably more top-heavy. The picture would be similar if we had used other countries (somewhat more pessimistic for Italy and Spain; more sanguine for France, which has kept fertility at much higher levels than its neighbors). The comparison is even more striking when we plot, in Figure 10 , Germany (left column)
Population pyramids in 2050: US v. Germany
against India (right column). It is hard to look at this figure without worrying about the 21 This is not necessarily the case in the arts and humanities; unfortunately, these otherwise worthwhile activities are less directly linked with TFP growth. 22 We use numbers from the U.S. Census Bureau as of February 11, 2017. In comparison with traditional population pyramids and to fit two countries in the same panel, we aggregate males and females (our argument does not depend on gender breakdowns) and, to ease comparison, we express population in each age group in percentages and not in absolute values. But, given historical experience, fertility patterns are highly persistent, and the recent wave of elections in Europe suggests that the willingness of European electorates to allow for large immigration flows is more limited than previously believed.
Three additional points
We would be remiss if we closed this section without briefly discussing three further points of some importance. A series of developments after 1968, however, eroded the foundations of this system. First, the political unrest of students and workers' strikes in 1968 led to a fast expansion of the welfare state, the introduction of restrictive labor regulations, and a strengthening of workers' collective bargaining position. An indication of the importance of these changes appears in Figure 11 , where we plot the capital income share in West Germany, France, the U.K., and
Italy normalized with respect to the historical mean. Due to the policies highlighted before, capital income shares dropped in the early 1970s, lowering the rate of return on capital and forcing firms to introduce new technologies that were less dependent on labor. The new technologies delivered an increase in the capital income share, but at the cost of permanently lower employment levels.
Second, the oil crisis of the 1970s put Europe, which mostly lacked local sources of petroleum and was heavily dependent on imports, at a severe disadvantage. This was particularly the case in economies such as France and Spain that had heavily invested in energyintensive industries and partially accounts for the aggressiveness of the French civilian nuclear program.
Third, technological change swung against Europe's "coordinated capitalism." Traditional industries well-suited for this system, such as coal, steel, car, or aerospace, that had been at the forefront of Europe's reconstruction after World War II started being replaced by IT, financial activities, and services to firms that required a much more flexible approach to labor management and openness to fast changes.
Despite these chinks in Europe's "coordinated capitalism" armor, a winning coalition composed of older workers, retirees, civil servants, and participants in protected sectors was able to remain in power throughout the following decades for three reasons.
First, the recovery of the world economy in the 1980s and the benefits from the significant investments in education that had started in the 1960s fueled enough economic growth to avoid serious social unrest. Second, the welfare state that sustained it was financed by a relatively less distortionary tax system than it might have seemed at first sight. European countries relied heavily on the VAT and labor income taxes, but capital income tax was surprisingly low in many of them. Third, the limits to political competition (electoral systems, campaign financing regulations, limited media) were still effective.
The losing coalition of this arrangement was composed of younger workers, the unemployed, and new sectors and firms. Unfortunately, it was these new sectors and firms that would have increased TFP had they been allowed to do so. These persistent declines in European economic growth of roughly two percentage points per year cumulate over time to very large level differences. This decline reflects both changes in labor input and changes in worker productivity. In terms of labor input, Prescott (2004) and Ohanian, Raffo, and Rogerson (2008) Hydraulic fracturing of shale for the production of oil and natural gas, also known as "fracking," was adopted in the U.S. during the 1990s. The development of this technology in the U.S. was facilitated by energy deregulation as well as private, rather than public, mineral rights (Gold, 2014) . Both of these factors provided strong incentives to invest in this technology. This method has revolutionized U.S. energy production. Rapid technological change has reduced production costs so much that fracking output increased between 2014 and 2016, when oil prices fell from about $100 per barrel to $30 per barrel. Because of fracking, U.S. oil production has roughly doubled between the 1990s and today.
Fracking has also changed the market for natural gas in the U.S. Technological change substantially reduced the production cost of shale gas, which in turn has lowered its price. The price of natural gas in the U.S. has declined by about 80 percent since 2005 as a consequence of fracking. Substantially higher natural gas production means that natural gas has reduced the use of coal in the U.S. production of electricity, which in turn has reduced greenhouse gas emissions significantly.
Fracking was initially considered to be a promising technology for Europe. European fracking also has the additional benefit of providing more energy independence to Europe at a time when Europe has been looking to reduce energy purchases from Russia and the Middle East. However, environmental concerns and political opposition has led Denmark France, Germany, and Scotland to ban fracking, and several other European countries have had fracking moratoriums in place at one time or another.
Beyond these restrictions on fracking, institutional differences between Europe and the U.S. also create very different incentives to invest in fracking. A major factor is property rights for mineral extraction. Mineral rights in the U.S. are largely private, while in contrast, mineral rights in Europe are largely public, which thus sharply limits profit opportunities for European producers.
Energy outcomes are remarkably different between Europe and the U.S. as a consequence of these very different policies. The U.S. is now the second largest global oil producer. The enormous increase in natural gas production has reduced U.S. greenhouse gas emissions to roughly 1990 levels. In comparison, energy and oil-intensive products such as petrochemicals and fertilizers are expensive in Europe. Compared to the U.S., the price of natural gas is more than twice as high in Europe. Consequently, coal use for electricity production is relatively higher than in the U.S., and greenhouse gas emissions are also higher than in the U.S. Europe's energy policy decisions have thus traded off one environmental issue for another, but in turn have reduced sectoral productivity and have continued European dependence on oil from
Russia and the Middle East.
Up until recently, U.S. institutional quality has changed in some similar ways to Europe (see Taylor, 2009, and Ohanian, Taylor, and Wright, 2011, for overviews) . Up through 2016, tax rates increased, and in some states, they have increased considerably for the most productive earners. Regulation also rose significantly, especially in financial markets through the Dodd-Frank legislation. This new financial regulation has raised the cost of making loans, particularly small business loans. This is because there is a significant fixed cost component in dealing with compliance and record-keeping issues that make smaller loans less profitable.
This becomes even more challenging for small banks (community banks), which have a lower revenue base over which to spread the fixed costs.
The impact of financial regulation may be significant. Mills and McCarthy (2014) describe how credit supply is not meeting small business demand for a variety of reasons that may reflect the effect of regulations, including the consolidation of community banks and the higher costs of making loans. This may implicitly bear on the level of competition within industries, particularly for small and new businesses. Gutiérrez and Philippon (2018) have argued that the higher level of concentration in U.S. markets due to lax anti-trust enforcement has made European Union markets more competitive than U.S. markets. Another area that may be affected by financial and other regulations is in the field of business startups and the ultimate success of those startups. Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2016) have documented a decline in high-growth young firms in the U.S. since 2000. Birch and Medoff (1994) introduced the term "gazelles" -a small subset of firm startups with unusually high growth potential. Pugsley, Sedlacek, and Sterk (2010) document that the fraction of gazelles in the U.S. firm startup population has declined by about a fifth. Moreover, they report that on average, gazelles grow less than they used to. More research is needed to determine how much of this worrisome decline is due to economic policies and how much is due to other factors.
On a more positive note, Duernecker, Herrendorf, and Valentinyi (2017) argue that the slowdown in TFP triggered by so-called Baumol's disease (i.e., the move toward services with stagnant productivity such as education) is nearly complete and that in the future we will observe a substitution of demand toward services with higher productivity growth as their relative prices fall. Also, a large cut in the corporate tax rate is making U.S. companies more competitive with those in Europe, and a substantial decrease in business regulation, including a partial rollback of Dodd-Frank, has increased business efficiency and has reduced compliance and record-keeping costs. U.S. labor input and investment's share of output are growing, and GDP growth has increased. In our view, the continuation of these favorable recent developments will depend on whether the U.S. continues to adopt more pro-market economic policies.
